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Résumé : Cet article étudie l’étendue de la convergence réelle entre les nano-
technologies et la biologie de synthèse, symbole des technosciences biologiques.
Pour traiter la question de la dichotomie entre le niveau des objets auquel
on observe un processus de pluralisation plutôt qu’une convergence, et le
niveau des discours, où le scénario de la convergence semble rester l’explica-
tion dominante, nous développons une analyse des disciplines comme disposi-
tifs au sens de Foucault. Cela permet de décrire précisément les différentes
strates composant les dispositifs et leurs dynamiques. La convergence des
Nanotechnologies, des Biotechnologies, des technologies de l’Information et des
sciences Cognitives (convergence NBIC) apparaît alors comme l’interprétation
réductrice d’un contexte scientifique et technologique complexe.
Abstract: This article studies the extent of the concrete convergence
between nanotechnology and synthetic biology, emblematic of the biological
technosciences. To address the issue of the dichotomy between the level of the
objects, where we observe a pluralization process more than a convergence, and
the level of the discourses, where the convergence scenario seems to remain
the dominant one, we develop an analysis of the disciplines as apparatuses
(“dispositifs”) in Foucault’s sense. This enables a precise description of
the different strata composing the apparatuses, and of their dynamics.
The convergence of Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology
and Cognitive science (NBIC convergence) then appears as a simplified
interpretation of a complex scientific and technological context.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 23(1), 2019, 57–72.
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1 Introduction
Fifteen years after Roco’s & Bainbridge’s foundational report on the con-
vergence of Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and
Cognitive science (NBIC convergence) [Roco & Bainbridge 2003], we may
start assessing to what extent these scientific and technological fields are
effectively converging. In 2003, when the report was released, most of the
fields were considered emergent, and the convergence was thus a projection
based on potential developments and on clues about the direction of these
developments. Fifteen years later, even if the developments of the different
disciplines were slower than predicted, we have sufficient elements to confront
the scenario of the convergence of the emerging technologies with the reality
of what is happening. We will focus, in this article, on the convergence of
nanotechnology and biotechnology.
When it was proposed in 2003, the NBIC convergence was not formulated
based on any observable reality. It was a projection of current tendencies
and potentials into the future. Furthermore, it was an ideological program,
putting forward the utopian vision of “a fantastic new wave of innovations”
[Est, Stemerding et al. 2014, 13] leading automatically to the “improvement
of human performance” [Roco & Bainbridge 2003, ix]. Guchet underlines the
two presuppositions of this program [Guchet 2014, 166]: first, the sciences
and technologies taking part in this convergence are only considered through
the applications they will be able to deliver, and second, it is possible to
mobilise an entire society towards one ultimate goal—in this case developing
applications that improve human performance. Thus, the NBIC convergence
is not another term for interdisciplinarity or for the usual process of the
integration of technology, it is a transhuman utopia based on capitalism: in the
framework given by Roco & Bainbridge, the ultimate meaning and direction
of the convergence is to be found in ideology.
The epistemological translation of the transhumanist program is the idea
that matter manipulation at the nanoscale (i.e., manipulation of atoms,
molecules or groups of them) will give birth to a transdisciplinary techno-
scientific culture. In this article, we will investigate the reality of such an
epistemological culture, and ask if there is a convergence of the sciences and
technologies beyond this kind of ideological reconstruction. To answer this
question, we will focus on the methods and objects of the different disciplines,
as well as on their epistemic cultures.
2 Apparatus analysis
Xavier Guchet explains that it is possible to take a step aside from the ideo-
logical program of the NBIC convergence to understand what is really at work
within the field of nanotechnology. According to this analysis, nanotechnology
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is not so much a convergence as a “proliferation, a pluralisation of the strategies
of intervention on matter1” [Guchet 2014, 167]. This observation is largely
valid for the other dimensions of the NBIC convergence as well, and especially
for biotechnology. Nevertheless, merely presenting the pluralisation process at
work leaves us with no possibility for discussing the idea of the NBIC conver-
gence. To avoid this conceptual trap, Guchet proposes talking about apparatus
(dispositif, in the sense given by Deleuze to Foucault’s concept) [Guchet
2014, 169]. As an apparatus is composed of heterogeneous elements (from
discourses or social entities to concrete technical objects), it integrates both the
concrete scientific and technical reality and the values mobilized by the actors.
For Guchet, the major advantage of this concept is that it unites the process
of organisation (“territorialization”, “stratification”) and the resistance to this
process, or the tendency towards another organisation (“deterritorialization”,
“line of flight”)2; it unites the actuality, even the materiality of a discipline,
and the potentiality still contained in the field as well as in the concrete objects
to develop into other directions (other scientific approaches, other modes of
action on the world, etc.).
The question we should ask then is: to what extent is there a convergence
between the NBIC apparatuses? The NBIC convergence program even
postulated the realisation of an NBIC apparatus in the near future. Its
foundation, its first stratum should now be observable, but leaving aside
the transhumanist reactivation of the NBIC convergence discourse, very few
scientific and technical results explicitly place themselves under the NBIC
label. There may be, nonetheless, an underlying converging process in day-
to-day scientific cultures and practices. We will investigate this hypothesis
by focusing on the convergence between the nanotechnology apparatus
and the biotechnology apparatus, and more precisely on the apparatus
of synthetic biology.
Synthetic biology is indeed the perfect candidate for analysing the state
of the convergence of biotechnology with nanotechnology. Synthetic biology
was defined during the “Synthetic biology 1.0 conference” (SB 1.0) held in
June 2004 at the Massachusetts’ Institute of Technology (MIT). While, the
conference did not refer to the NBIC convergence, it took place soon after
the release of Roco & Bainbridge’s report. Moreover, the conference was held
in the very “application oriented” context of MIT, and claimed that synthetic
biology is both “scientific and engineering research” [Endy, Knight et al. 2004].
By its focus on applications, its research in computationally assisted rational
design, and its claim that it will technically master life, synthetic biology—in
1. All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
2. Territorialization and deterritorialization are two key-concepts developed by
Deleuze & Guattari [Deleuze & Guattari 1980]. They express antagonistic dynamics,
the first is a dynamic of organisation, or “stratification”, the second of disorganisation,
of creation of potential. But they are also circular dynamics, because any
deterritorialization tends to stratify (either by reterritorializing or by creating a new
stratum), while any stratum produces deterritorialization processes at its margins.
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its MIT definition—displays a number of characteristics that qualify it as part
of the NBIC convergence.
Moreover, as is the case for the other emergent scientific and technological
fields of the early 2000s, synthetic biology (SB) can best be understood as a
program, or an ambition rather than as a well-defined field. The presentation
of SB 1.0 admits that the scientific and technical objectives (“to design and
build biological parts, devices and integrated biological systems” [Endy, Knight
et al. 2004]) need further technological support to be possible. Synthetic biol-
ogy, as a discipline, structures itself around hypotheses and objectives, and not
around a paradigmatic theory or shared methods. Bensaude-Vincent explains
that the epistemic diversity in the discipline is possible because of an epistemic
opportunism, grounded in a “hard-rock optimism”, shared by the researchers
promoting synthetic biology [Bensaude-Vincent 2013a]. The scientists engaged
in synthetic biology never seem to be discouraged in their claims by negative
results: they adapt and pursue their program. In consequence, synthetic
biology has developed in many directions, encompassing research previously
included in different disciplines (chemistry, genetic engineering, molecular
biology, bioinformatics, etc.). Nevertheless, the organisation of synthetic
biology is similar to that of traditional disciplines [Bensaude-Vincent 2013b,
122]: it is organised around specific journals and international conferences, it
has its own academic courses and degrees, etc. The annual conferences (SB x.0)
and the international Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM) competition
for students have done much for the international visibility and the rapid
organisation of the discipline, as well as for the diffusion of epistemic optimism
as a shared culture.
As with nanotechnology, which subsumed very diverse scientific and
technological domains of research, synthetic biology is not reducible to any
simple definition. It was indeed rapidly used as a label for many research
programs, such as gene editing, gene regulation or gene deleting (all of
which are now rather simply obtained with CRISPR-Cas9)3 [Tremblay 2015],
complete genome editing [Dymond & Boeke 2012], complete genome synthesis
[Venter 2013], metabolic pathway engineering [Cameron, Bashor et al. 2014],
[Del Vecchio 2015], as well as attempts at cell synthesis [Wu & Tan 2014]
or research programs in xeno-genetics [Malyshev, Dhami et al. 2014], [Taylor,
Pinheiro et al. 2014]. All these research programs do not have many aspects in
common, save the recourse to strategies of synthesis. The concept of apparatus
is therefore essential for expressing this special form of very tenuous unity (that
is not thereby pure diversity either) and for encompassing a range of research
objects as well as epistemic positions.
3. CRISPR-Cas9 is a molecular complex formed by a specific structure of ri-
bonucleic acid (CRISPR meaning Clustered Regularly-Interspaced Short Palindromic
Repeats), and by the Cas9 enzyme.
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3 The convergence towards the
molecular scale
Taking a step sideways from the programmatic stratum of the NBIC conver-
gence, we would like to evaluate the concrete convergence of the apparatuses
of nanotechnology and of synthetic biology, and, for this, our starting point
will be at the level of objects. We now have fifteen years of experiments in
the different fields that we can use to measure a potential overlapping of the
research strategies and a potentially increasing intertwining of the objects.
One of the claims of the NBIC convergence program is indeed the transversal
manipulation of matter at the atomic level. In nanotechnology, this may
mean quite literally moving atoms one at a time using a Scanning Tunneling
Microscope (STM). Nevertheless, as Guchet demonstrates, scale is problematic
even within the domain of nanotechnology and nanoscience [Guchet 2014,
38], and most of the experiments in nanotechnology as in synthetic biology
involve a large number of atoms, in particular when dealing with proteins.
Can we nevertheless identify converging capacities to act on matter? When
we look at the two ends of the spectrum, action on matter in nanotechnology
seems radically different from what it is in synthetic biology. Nanotechnology,
as we pointed out, can move individual atoms with a STM, while synthetic
biology can use the metabolic processes of bacteria or yeasts to assemble large
fragments of synthetic DNA (tens of thousands of genetic base-pairs) via the
very efficient homologous recombination processes of the cell [Venter 2013, 93],
[Annaluru, Muller et al. 2014, 55].
The middle of the spectrum of scale might well be more useful for
understanding why there may be a convergence, but the middle is located
in the domain of neither physics nor biology, instead it concerns chemistry.
The “nanomachines” of nanotechnology, as well as the molecular blocks
(monomers) that constitute the polymers (proteins, ribonucleic acids (RNA),
deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA), etc.) with which synthetic biology works, are
molecules of the order of magnitude of the nanometre. Many experiments
in nanoscience and nanotechnology take advantage of chemical dynamics to
assemble artificial molecular structures that can then use a specific chemical
reaction (or reaction cycle) to produce movement. The work of Jean-Pierre
Sauvage, who shared the Nobel prize in chemistry in 2016, illustrates this:
[2]catenane, for example, is composed of two intertwined rings that are
assembled using the spatial organization property of a copper atom. Once
assembled, one of the rings can move relative to the other using reduction-
oxidation reactions [Sauvage 2017, 38]. Similarly, DNA and RNA are
synthesized in vitro using a repeated four-step chemical protocol [Ma, Tang
et al. 2012]. The technique on which synthetic biology is based is thus a form
of nanotechnology, even if it is very rarely described this way, in the sense that
it takes advantage of the assembling properties of chemical dynamics.
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Chemistry can thus be seen as the real scale of the convergence, although
this thesis would require a redefinition of the epistemological core of the
NBIC convergence. While the NBIC convergence postulates a reductionist
and atomistic approach centered on the idea of incremental engineering at the
scale of the atom (as symbolised by the application of STM), Jean-Pierre
Sauvage’s chemically synthesised “nanomachines”, as well as much of the
synthesis and modification techniques used in synthetic biology, take advantage
of the dynamics of quite complex chemical systems. This convergence is
thus less a mastery over matter in a mechanical sense, and more a “patient
negotiation” with the forces active at the nanoscale [Guchet 2014, 167].
Other techniques link, at the molecular level, atomic organisation of matter
to biological applications, substantiating the convergence in its more usual
sense. Microarrays are a good example of nanostructured materials used in a
biological context. The microarray developed by the NanoBioSystèmes (NBS)
group of the Laboratoire d’Analyse et d’Architecture des Systèmes (LAAS,
CNRS, France) combines nanostructuring, molecular chemistry and optical
properties of the system for biomedical diagnosis [Cau, Lalo et al. 2009]. The
microarray itself is a glass slide on which nanogrooves of molecules, which
serve as probes, are “printed”. The idea is that the molecules to be detected
in the biosample will attach themselves to the molecular probes. Once they
are linked, the new molecular structure on the microarray modifies the way
light is diffracted, thus enabling the diagnosis by simple optical observation.
More generally, nanostructured surfaces are powerful and versatile tools for
biology: they can serve not only for detection, but also for catalysis, or as
a biomimetic surface for starting the synthesis of biomolecules or biomimetic
molecular complexes.
Biomimetics is an important symbol of the nano-bio convergence, and
provides ready arguments in favour of the NBIC convergence hypothesis.
However, studying an example more closely leads us to qualify the storytelling
behind the NBIC convergence. The NBS group of the LAAS developed a
research program aimed at the synthesis of a molecular motor identical to
the one in E-coli’s flagellum. It was a purely biomimetic approach but with
important scientific and technological significance in nanotechnology, because
it would have been a methodological proof of concept of the synthesis of
a very complex biological structure. It would have been a significant step
forward in the research on nano-engines as the motor in the flagellum is
indeed a powerful source of mechanical work (at the cellular scale) that uses an
electrochemical gradient to function. The experimental protocol uses surfaces
with a nano-printed molecular layer mimicking the cell membrane [Chalmeau,
Dagkessamanskaia et al. 2009]. The proteins, obtained through a biochemical
reaction inside vesicle-bioreactors, auto-assemble on the surface as if on a cell
membrane. Synthetic biology plays an important role in the experiment, while
remaining quite separated: another laboratory, specialised in synthetic biology,
delivered the materials (the proteins) that were assembled. This collaboration
between nanotechnology and synthetic biology enabled the analysis of some
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aspects of the flagellar motor, but fell short of delivering the complete synthesis
that was promised. A quick search of the literature seems to confirm that the
project of a complete synthesis of such a complex protein structure remains
excessively ambitious: scientists are still figuring out the structure and the
mechanisms of such ensembles.
With this example, we see that there is a difference between what is
announced at the programmatic level and what can actually be done in
the laboratory: the “nanomotor” was never synthesised, the experiments
just used the technical tools available to progress in the comprehension of
a complex protein-based structure. While the research program put forward
the application (the synthesis of a powerful nanomotor), the research results
were in reality fundamental, and more significant as proofs of concept, on
one hand for the use of protocell bioreactors, and on the other for the use of
biomimetic nanosurfaces. It was thus a rather classic scientific program, closer
to fundamental biochemistry than to nanotechnology. Moreover, it is difficult
to call this collaboration between nanotechnology and synthetic biology a
convergence in any strong sense, because there was neither a convergence of
the research topics, nor a sharing of competences.
In contradiction with what the NBIC convergence suggests, beneath the
surface of the general branding terms (“nano” or “synthetic biology”) there
is still a strong resistance from the traditional epistemic cultures. Despite
diplomas in nanotechnology or in synthetic biology, the researchers still define
themselves as molecular biologists, chemists, physicists, bioinformaticians,
engineers, etc., who do nanotechnology or synthetic biology [Kastenhofer 2013,
133], [Klein 2010, 53]. The complexity of objects in these disciplines requires
a level of specialisation from the scientists, engineers and technicians that is
incompatible with a transdisciplinary professional identity. It is nonetheless
possible to argue that the reason that interdisciplinary collaboration has
become so frequent in contemporary science is because the “emergent”
disciplines are converging, at least at the programmatic level. This (inter-)
disciplinary paradox points to the complexity of the dynamics within and
between the apparatuses in the nanosciences. We observe what we may call a
“converging territorialization” at the programmatic level, producing examples
of effective collaborations between laboratories from different disciplines,
confirming the idea of the transdisciplinary value of epistemic optimism. But,
at the same time, we observe a multiplication of objects, involving a plurality
of scientific and technical skills, as well as a plurality of methods, strengthening
the divergent territorialization of the more traditional disciplines.
4 Converging engineering ambitions
Following Bensaude-Vincent, who explains that the unity of synthetic biology
has more to do with a general epistemic attitude than with any well-established
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paradigm, homogeneous objects or methods, we have to evaluate the epistemic
dimension(s) of the nanotechnology and synthetic biology apparatus. The
nano-bio convergence at the material level of the objects may indeed be
ambiguous, but it might still be strongly driven by a shared perception of
the world and of our modalities of action on it, forming a common epistemic
background for the plurality of the research programs.
According to Guchet, the core epistemic attitude of the nanotechnology
apparatus is defined by the ambition to invent and develop engineering modali-
ties and processes at the nanoscale [Guchet 2014, 95], where classic engineering
approaches are inoperative. It is thus a technology-oriented epistemic vision,
grounded in the belief that engineering is possible at the nanoscale despite
the quantic properties of matter, and especially its probabilistic behaviour
(in opposition to the deterministic behaviour of matter at the macroscale).
The hypothesis of bottom-up engineering—atom by atom—has proven difficult
to implement concretely, but nanotechnology has invented more complex
processes mixing bottom-up techniques (nano-structured surfaces for example)
with top-down approaches (mimicking biochemical reactions, or using the
auto-assembling properties of molecules). The idea of an opportunist epistemic
attitude, requiring reasoning and imagination [Bensaude-Vincent 2013a], can
thus be applied to nanotechnology as well as to synthetic biology.
Conversely, the engineering culture is not only characteristic of nanotech-
nology, it is also a prominent feature of some branches of synthetic biology.
The engineering culture was determinant in structuring synthetic biology: its
original distinction from the rest of biology was supported by scientists with
engineering backgrounds (Drew Endy, Tom Knight, Robert Carlson, Roger
Brent), who would even have preferred the more explicit name “intentional
biology” [Campos 2010, 17]. A number of experiments seek to prove the
pertinence of the analogy between cellular processes and micro-electronics,
and between genetic regulation and computing. For example, in 2013, the
implementation of several genetic logic-gates was reported: scientists managed
to condition the expression of the gene coding for Green Fluorescent Protein
(GFP) to the presence of two chemical inputs according to their logical
relations (AND, OR, NOR) [Cameron, Bashor et al. 2014, 6]. In the same
line of work, the title of an article is explicit concerning the computing
and electronic analogy: “Robust multicellular computing using genetically
encoded NOR gates and chemical ‘wires’ ” [Tamsir, Tabor et al. 2010].
These examples give weight to the heuristic image of genetically programming
a biological chassis.
Engineering also plays a more fundamental epistemological role in deter-
mining directions of research, such as the pursuit of modularity and orthog-
onality in genetic design. Modularity—usually illustrated by the image of
Lego bricks—is typically a requirement of traditional engineering: it is indeed
essential that the functional modules (in the case of synthetic biology, the
genetic building blocks, such as genes and regulators) can be connected in
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the desired order, and universally recognised. The entire BioBrick program4
developed around MIT and the iGEM competition is based on the modularity
principle (BioBrick foundation). The orthogonality principle stipulates that
independent modules should not have any effect on each other: put simply,
one program should not change the execution of another. Once again, the
computer analogy is very present. We have to note here that these two research
orientations continue to encounter numerous obstacles [Vilanova, Tanner et al.
2015], [Del Vecchio 2015, 117], practical as well as theoretical, especially due
to the chemical specificity of the different organisms, and due to Brownian
chemical interactions in the cell. The chemical materiality of the genetic
“software” interacts permanently with the non-universal cellular “hardware”.
Nevertheless, because of the epistemic optimism of synthetic biologists, the
computer analogy remains a powerful intuition in the discipline.
The engineering epistemology is indubitably a force of convergence between
the different apparatuses. It also clearly reflects the claim of the NBIC
convergence that it will be possible to act, at both the atomic and the
molecular levels, on life as well as on matter. This dynamic of convergence
thus conveys a strong atomistic metaphysics in the field of biology. It is
especially visible when considering the engineering strategies: modularity
and orthogonality both require and produce atomistic interaction in the cell.
These research strategies aim at breaking the concrete synergetic system of
the cell down into independent, rationally designed building-blocks, in order
to make the bottom-up engineering of life not only possible, but similar to
the traditional engineering approach using mechanical parts. More generally,
cells, in the field of industrial synthetic biology (including most of the genetic
engineering), are considered abstractly as independent production units: a
given cell must realise the entire metabolic process, and when the chemical
transformation process is divided into several steps, these steps are usually
distributed between different types of organisms, often separated into different
milieux. The atomistic epistemology presiding over most engineering oriented
branches of synthetic biology thus encompasses the regulation processes in
the cell, as well as the cells themselves. This atomistic epistemology is
reinforced by the classical use of “domesticated” yeasts and bacteria, which
live well in homogeneous colonies, and consequently display less synergistic
behaviours. By contrast, the studies of microbial life in natural environments
give us a completely different picture of “normal” microbial existence and
metabolic activity, in these contexts cooperation, specialization and continued
association are very frequent [Dupré 2014, 221].
Engineering thus constitutes a force pushing towards strong converg-
ing territorialization, catalysing the epistemological program of the NBIC
convergence to master nature from atoms to cells. Conversely, we have
seen previously that the concrete scientific and technological results produce
a pluralisation of the objects and of the modes of interaction with the
4. https://biobricks.org/.
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forces of nature. All these processes induce contradictory dynamics in the
epistemic dimensions of the apparatuses, because the pluralisation process has
consequences on the theoretical models and on the implicit metaphysics behind
the epistemic positions. While some proofs of concept in nanotechnology as in
synthetic biology confirm the epistemic validity of atomist engineering of mat-
ter and of life, experimental failures and alternative strategies simultaneously
support competing epistemic attitudes (emerging structures from complex
interactions, ecological synergy, etc.) grounded in divergent metaphysical
perspectives (emergentism, holism).
5 Epistemic metastability:
a plurality of potential re-compositions
The apparatuses seem to be best understood as being in an ambivalent
relationship to the NBIC convergence. Some strata are territorializing in the
sense of a convergence, while other competing territorializations, as well as
lines of flight, tend to produce a dynamics of divergence. Our analysis has
enabled us to understand more precisely to what extent the nanotechnology
apparatus and the synthetic biology apparatus converge, but we are no closer
to understanding the general validity of the NBIC convergence theory.
For that, it is necessary to take another step aside and consider that the
apparatuses are intrinsically under-determined. To put it differently, as they
are constantly evolving, the description we make of these apparatuses is always
partially inadequate, asynchronous. The NBIC convergence is one way to
describe the apparatuses, but there are also other ways to make sense out of
them. As they are intrinsically plural and proliferating, they hardly qualify
as “normal science”, but neither abnormal nor in crisis. Using the concept of
apparatus to describe nanotechnology or synthetic biology draws our attention
to their own normality: being complex, dynamic, evolving, unpredictable,
laden with potential. Simondon’s concept of metastability characterises such
a state, where a system is, so to speak, more than one: metastability defines a
system so saturated in potential and in internal tensions that a perturbation
of the system would produce a transformation towards a new equilibrium
[Simondon 2005, 26]. While metastability might be the normal state of the
“emergent” sciences and technologies, it could also be a transition phase in
science. From this perspective, the NBIC convergence appears as a strong
performative reduction, a means to impose direction and meaning on the
relative indeterminacy of contemporary science. Thus, it is important to
reinstate the apparatuses in their plurality of open potentials.
The technical dimensions of both the nanotechnology and the synthetic bi-
ology apparatuses are clearly convergent, but the meaning of this convergence
is still to be determined. As we have said previously, specific experiments in
one field or the other may use elements produced by the other field: synthetic
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biology may be used to produce specific biomolecules for nanotechnological
application, and nanotechnology may produce nanomaterials or nanosurfaces
for synthetic biology to use as a catalyst, observation device, etc. The technical
continuity is thus unquestionable, and constitutes a territorialization around
the molecular scale common to both apparatuses. But, for now, the technical
culture strata remain heterogeneous because of the specialization required to
master these complex techniques. Even within the domain of synthetic biology,
each modification technique, each model organism, almost each genetic design
strategy requires a specific competence, and a dose of tinkering, of “kludging”
[O’Malley 2009, 382], that participates in producing technical and scientific
cultures specific to a laboratory and/or a team, sometimes even specific to a
single researcher. The complexity of the technical protocols forces engineers
and technicians to be highly specialised, thus rendering a transversal technical
culture utopian.
In this context, the NBIC convergence program nonetheless postulates an
actualisation of the epistemic uncertainty around transdisciplinary engineer-
ing, or in other words it anticipates the reinforcement of the territorialization
dynamic. But the intrinsic diversity of the research programs in synthetic
biology tends to oppose this program of convergence, especially because
it opens numerous potentials for alternative territorializations. The recent
and spectacular efficiency increase and cost decrease of genetic synthesis,
genetic sequencing and genetic modification have indeed accelerated the
externalization process of these technical aspects of synthetic biology: the
technical manipulations are performed today by biology technicians and
specialised bio-industries. While the existence of such industries confirms
the convergent territorialization, the externalization of numerous technical
aspects by the scientific laboratories acts as a competing deterritorialization
process. Synthetic biologists, that have worked for around three decades to
invent, perfect and master techniques enabling them to act on the genome,
to read it and to reproduce it, can now focus on designing new experiments
for “fundamental” research like, for example, using genetically modified cells
to explore the spatial configuration of the genome, especially during specific
phases of cellular development [Mercy, Mozziconacci et al. 2017], or on
engineering metabolic processes of industrial or environmental interest. In
other words, the more mature the technique is, the less important it is in the
daily focus of the scientific fields. The technique stops being a research object
in itself, and it becomes the background for action and for other research
projects. The creation of new potential by the techniques thus opens up new
development paths for the sciences, and contradicts the simplifying idea of a
unidirectional convergence of the sciences and technologies.
The epistemological dimensions of the nanotechnology and synthetic
biology apparatuses are also more contrasted than the NBIC convergence
program would have us believe. There are in particular other territorialization
tendencies, and other potential epistemic reconfigurations than those of the
NBIC convergence. For example, synthetic biology is often associated with
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system biology. System biology can also be described as an emergent science, in
the sense that it has developed rapidly following the increase of computational
power, and especially the increased capacity to model complex systems,
linked to the exponential capacity to collect huge amounts of biological data.
The point of convergence between synthetic biology and system biology,
justifying their institutional association, is the importance of modelling, and
thus the central place of bioinformatics. Naïvely, system biology could be
included in the NBIC convergence, as part of the bio-info convergence, but
an interesting feature of system biology is its strongly analytical epistemic
position [Kastenhofer 2013, 136]. From this perspective, then, the process
of territorialization is very different from the one of NBIC: it is not driven
by technical action goals, but by knowledge goals. Compared to the NBIC
program, system biology represents a deterritorialization of the bioinformatics
synergy towards complex interactions and interdependencies between the
multiple levels of organisation inside the cell, and more generally in the living
world. Dupré points out the renewed interest for the interactions between
the organisms and the environment, notably through epigenetics, and for
mutualistic collaborations and interdependency situations, as exemplified by
the numerous studies of metagenomics about the microbiota—the microbial
ecosystems that live in symbiosis with every macroscopic organism [Dupré
2014]. Dupré explains how this research profoundly transforms the paradigm of
biology, from a theory structured by individual genetic identity and Darwinian
selection (including competition for survival), to a theory structured by
dynamic genetic interactions and vital interdependency [Dupré 2014, 203].
The pluralisation processes at the epistemological level present a challenge
different from the pluralisation of the objects or even of the modes of action:
how may a discipline—in this specific case, biology—continue to make sense
as a whole, if its theories are pluralising? The picture of biology presented
by metagenomics seems quite different from the picture presented by the
engineering oriented branches of synthetic biology, yet they represent two
possible developments of contemporary biology in convergence with other
disciplines. The major difficulty in articulating the engineering oriented
branches of synthetic biology and the branches of microbiology oriented
towards complexity analysis is the divergent ontological furniture used in each
field. On one hand, the biological entities are expressed in terms of atomistic
technological elements (program, chassis, logic gates, regulation circuits, etc.),
and on the other, these same entities are expressed in terms of holistic
ecological parameters (chemical conditions of the milieu, messages, mutualistic
interactions, etc.). To make sense of this ontological divergence resulting from
the different dynamics at play in an apparatus, Quine’s philosophy may be
of help. Quine explains that the ontological furniture of a discipline, its
system of objects, is relative to its particular system of word relations, i.e., its
general theory [Quine 1969, 50]. Based on a holistic and pragmatic theory of
language, the relativity of ontology to epistemology implies that translation is
always possible between theories, on the express condition that it respects the
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relations organising the ontological system [Quine 1969, 50]. The possibility
of translation explains why all epistemic positions included in a metastable
epistemic system remain commensurable. In the example of contemporary
biology, it would indeed be absurd to think that two sources of knowledge
such as synthetic biology and metagenomics, or epigenetics, are oblivious of
each other. There is knowledge circulation between these approaches, thanks
to translation processes.
We can generalise this idea in considering all territorialization and deterri-
torialization processes in situations of epistemic metastability as consequences
of translation choices. The NBIC convergence relies on translating the different
ontologies in terms of mechanical engineering. One example in nanotechnology
of this choice of translation is the description of the dynamic molecular
structures as “machines” or “motors”: most of the phenomena could just
as well be described in terms of chemical reactions and configurations as in
terms of the transformation of an energy impulsion into mechanical work.
In the case of synthetic biology, the example of the “genetically engineered
machine” (the “GEM” in iGEM) is similar: talking about implementing
a genetic program in a biological chassis, sometimes even using the terms
software and hardware, includes the objects of synthetic biology in the field
of electronic and computational engineering, while it is also possible to talk
about gene expression, metabolic functions, etc., and indeed these two forms
of discourse coexist in the field of synthetic biology. As both the apparatuses
are complex mixes of dynamics, some territorializing them as part of the NBIC
convergence, others, on the contrary, opening deterritorializing potential, the
NBIC convergence appears to be only one possible system of translation,
indeed overlapping parts of both of them, but without exhausting the entire
potential of either of them.
6 Conclusion
Evaluating the reality of the nano-bio convergence by comparing the nan-
otechnology apparatus and the synthetic biology apparatus enables us to
see the NBIC convergence for what it is: one of the processes that the
two apparatuses have in common. On one hand, the NBIC convergence is
thus a powerful performative territorialization process, based on concretely
converging technical and epistemic tendencies, and motivated by an ideological
vision, on the other hand, it is only one way to make sense of the reality of
the apparatuses by translating compatible variables and objects into the same
discourse. The NBIC convergence, and more generally, the interpretation of
the metastable state in which contemporary sciences and technologies are
as a convergence, is a simplification. It presents the epistemic plurality
and the proliferation of the modes of interaction with the world as a
unidimensional dynamic. The pertinence of the idea of convergence is
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thus questionable, and since it clearly is an ideologically oriented program,
it should be presented as such.
Another way to make sense out of this complexity is therefore to analyse
the translation processes of ontologies that happen at the epistemic level, the
knowledge circulation, the decompartmentalization of traditional disciplines,
and the actual modes of existence of the objects and beings produced by the
disciplines. As Guchet explains clearly in his study of nanotechnology, finding
the right angle to make sense out of emergent technosciences is difficult, but
it is an ethical necessity.
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